ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

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Defendant Google LLC ("Google") opposes Plaintiffs' Administrative Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (ECF No. 269). Plaintiffs failed to comply with the meet-andconfer requirements of Local Rule 7-11 and this Court's Standing Order, and the attached article is not proper "authority."

- 1. Plaintiffs Violated Local Rule 7-11 and the Court's Standing Order. Local Rule 7-11(a) requires an administrative motion to include "either a stipulation under Civil L.R. 7-12 or ... a declaration that explains why a stipulation could not be obtained." This Court's Civil Standing Order likewise mandates that at least seven days "before filing any motion, the moving party must meet and confer with the opposing party" and in the notice of motion "must certify that this meetand-confer requirement has been satisfied." Standing Order § VIII.A. The Court "may strike" a motion that lacks "such a certification." Id. Plaintiffs met none of these requirements. They never offered to meet and confer, never sought a stipulation, and did not file the required declaration or certification. The motion appeared on ECF without any notice to Defendants. That is grounds enough for denying it.
- 2. The Submitted Article Is Not "Supplemental Authority." The academic working paper Plaintiffs submit as "supplemental authority" is not a judicial opinion, statute, or rule—and thus not "authority." While Civil L.R. 7-11 doesn't define "authority," courts routinely use the term to mean legal authorities decided after briefing. See Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. Bible, 804 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 28(j) "permits a party to bring new *authorities* to the attention of the court; it is not designed to bring new evidence through the back door"); Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 710 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (striking letter that offered "no new authorities" and instead sought to supplement the record); Junkersfeld v. Per Diem Staffing Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 2247768, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2019) (declining to consider "proposed rule" submitted as supplemental authority because it was "not binding nor persuasive"). Plaintiffs' Exhibit A is an academic article commentary, not law and not properly submitted.

GOOGLE'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

1		Respectfully submitted,
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GOOGLE'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY